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Abstract 
This paper deals with aseries of semantic contrasts between the copula be and the preposition 
as, two functional elements that both head elementary predication structures.  It will be argued 
that the meaning of as is  a type  lowering device  shifting the meaning of its  complement NP 
from  generalized quantifier type to property type (where properties are conceived as relations 
between individuals and situations), while the copula be induces a type coercion from (partial) 
situations to (total) possible worlds.  Paired with van der Sandt's 1992 theory ofpresupposition 
accommodation, these assumptions will account for the observed contrasts between as and be. 
1.  Introduction 
From a semanticist's point of view, the preposition as is a more or less redundant lexical item. 
While other prepositions have a clear idiosyncratic lexical meaning, as usually doesn't express 
anything beyond the relation of  predication, The constructions in (1) illustrate this. 
(1)  a.  As a skeptical person, J  ohn expressed doubts 
b.  We saw J  ohn as a soccer player 
At some level of abstraction, (I a) contains the predication John  is a skeptical person and (1 b) 
John is a soccer player.  Since NPs like a skeptical person or a soccer player are usually con-
sidered to be predicates at least in one of their readings, as does not make an obvious semantic 
contribution here. 
Under certain analyses, the same can be said about the copula verb be.  So the null theory about 
the semantics of these !wo lexical items is that-despite their syntactic differences-they are 
synonymous, both denoting the identity fimction over properties, i.e.  ).,p. P. I 
Despite these similarities between as and be, complexes ofthe form "as + NP" show a semantic 
behavior that is different from copular predicates, i.e. predicates ofthe form "be + NP". Fernald 
2000, who discusses some oflhese effects, christened them "copula effects". This terminology 
suggests that it is the behavior of the copula that requires explanation, while the preposition as 
behaves regularly. The proposal that I am going to make here justifies this. 
We will focus on three effects: 
1.1.  Perception reports 
PPs headed by as may appear as embedded predicate in direct perception reports (in the sense 
of Barwise 1981), while copuJar predicates are excluded there. 
* Special thanks go to Yael Sharvit and Werner Wolff for insightful suggestions conceming thc sernantics of  as, 
and to Reinhard Blutner, Rcgine Eckardt, Michael Grabski aod Ewald Lang for comments on a previous version 
of  this paper. 
IThere are  also syntactic arguments to  subsume as and  be under one category;  see for  instance BoweIs 1993 
who treats these lexical items as two instantiations of  a functional category "predication". 
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(2)  a.  We saw John as a soccer player 
b.  We saw John *be/*being a soccer player 
Two things should be noted here.  The deviance of (2b) cannot simply be attributed to syntax, 
since both naked infinitives and gerunds are generally admitted in the complement of verbs of 
perception: 
(3)  a.  We saw John walk 
b.  We saw John walking 
As for (2a), it should be noted that it  is notjust John who is the object ofourperception, and who 
in turn is a soccer player.  Rather, the sentence reports the perception of an abstract eventuality 
that supports the truth of "John is  a soccer player".  The arguments in favor of this view are 
parallel to Barwise's 1981  for  a analogous semantic analysis of constructions Jike (3a).  Most 
importantJy, the inference from (4a) and (b) to (c) is invalid, but it should be valid ifthe as-PP 
were a secondary predicate. 
(4)  a.  We saw John 
b.  He was a soccer player at this time 
c.  Thus we saw John as a soccer player 
These things taken into account,  (2)  provides a genuine minimal pair that requires explana-
tion.  This contrast was presumably first noticed in Stump 1985. The analysis provided there is 
unsatisfactory though for several reasons that will be discussed below. 
1.2.  Individual guises 
lndividuals ought to be consistent. Your car, say, cannot be both expensive and inexpensive at 
the same time. So (5) is pragmatically deviant. 
(5)  Your car is expensive, and it is inexpensive 
It is possible though to ascribe conflicting properties to  one  and the same individual if the 
predication is appropriately qualified: 
(6)  Compared with Bill's car, your car is expensive, but in comparison to Henry's car, it is 
.  . 
mexpenslve 
Free as-adjuncts are a good way to supply this kind of qualification of a predication. 
(7)  a.  As a toy your car is expensive, but as a car it is inexpensive 
b.  As ajudge John is corrupt, but as ajanitor he is not corrupt (after Landman 1989) 
c.  As an advisor, Gloria is reliable, but as an administrator she is unreliable (after Katz 
1994) 
All these example are  consistent.  A possible analysis (that we will not endorse in the  end 
but which is an intuitively enlightening starting point),  individuals come in different guises, 
and they may have different properties under different guises.  Under this perspective, free as-
adjuncts specify the guise of(the referent of) the subject ofthe main predication. Copular free 
adjuncts are unable to do so.  All the subsequent examples are inconsistent. 
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(8)  a.  Being a toy, your car is expensive, but being a car, it is inexpensive 
b.  Being ajudge, John is corrupt, but being ajanitor, he is not corrupt 
c.  Being an advisor, Gloria is reliable, but being an administrator, she is unreliable 
1.3.  Free adjuncts 
Both as and be are licit as heads of free adjuncts in the sense of  Stump 1985. This is illustrated 
in (9). 
(9)  a.  As a semanticist, Mary is a linguist 
b.  Being a semanticist, Mary is a linguist 
Stump noticed that the class of free adjuncts is divided into two subclasses. The crucial contrast 
is illustrated in (10) - (13), on the one hand, and (14) - (17) on the other (taken from Stump 
1985:41): 
(10)  a.  Wearing that new outfit, Bill would fool everyone 
b.  If  he wore that new outfit, Bill would fool everyone 
(11)  a.  Standing on achair, John can touch the ceiling 
b.  lf  he stands on achair, John can touch the ceiling 
(12)  a.  Taken in the prescribed dosage, it must be very effective 
b.  If it is taken in the prescribed dosage, it must be very effective 
(13)  a.  In first gear, the truck might reach the top ofthat hill 
b.  If  it were in first gear, the truck might reach the top of that hill 
Hefe the (b)-sentences are paraphrases of one ofthe readings ofthe (a)-sentences. Stump calls 
the adjuncts in these examp1es weak. They are to be contrasted with the following ones: 
(14)  a.  Being a master of disguise, Bill would fool everyone 
b.  Ifhe were a master of disguise, Bill would fool everyone 
(15)  a.  Having unusually 10ng arms, John can touch the ceiling 
b.  Ifhe has unusually 10ng arms, John can touch the ceiling 
(16)  a.  Containing twice the iron in apound of calf's liver, it must be very effective 
b.  If it contains twice the iron in apound of calf's liver, it must be very effective 
(17)  a.  Weighing only a few tons, the truck might reach the top of that hill 
b.  Ifit weighs only a few tons, the truck might reach the top ofthat hill 
Here the (a)-sentences cannot be paraphrased by the (b)-sentences. These adjuncts Stump calls 
strong. Note though that both weak and strong adjuncts admit a reading that can be paraphrased 
with the help of  since, so (l8a) can mean (l8b) and (l9a) is paraphrasable as (l9b). 
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(18)  a.  In first gear, the truck might reach the top of  that hill 
b.  Since it is in first gear, the truck might reach the top of that hill 
(19)  a.  Weighing only a few tons, the truck might reach the top ofthat hill 
b.  Since it weighs only a few tons, the truck might reach the top of that hill 
The observation that is crucia1 for our purposes is the fact that be-adjuncts are always strong 
while as-adjuncts are invariably weak. The next example is again Stump's (op. cil. pp. 86). 
(20)  a.  Being a blonde, Mary might look something like lane 
b.  As a blonde, Mary might look something like laue 
c.  If  she were a blonde, Mary might look something like lane 
(21)  a.  Being a semanticist, Mary would be a linguist 
b.  As a semanticist, Mary would be a linguist 
c.  If  she were a semanticist, Mary would be a linguist 
(22)  a.  Being a supervisor, Sam is always strict 
b.  As a supervisor Sam is always strict 
c.  If  he is a supervisor, Sam is always strict 
In all these cases, the (b  )-sentence but not the (a  )-sentence can be paraphrased as in (c). 
These observations conclude the initial survey of the issues that will be addressed in the paper. 
The plan is as  follows.  In section 2 we will briefly review Carlson's  1977 treatment of the 
perception report data. We will propose a modification of his theory that makes crucial use of  a 
situation based ontology. It avoids some shortcomings that Carlson's approach is faced with. In 
section 3 we will take up the issue of individual guises. We will argue that the effects sketched 
above arise out of a particular kind of presupposition accommodation and resolution of lexical 
underspecification.  As background theory of  presupposition accommodation, we will assume 
van der Sandt 1992.  Section 4 puts the pieces from sections 2 and 3 together and presents a 
natural explanation of Stump's weak/strong contrasts.  In the final  section we will summarize 
our findings and mention some issues for further research. 
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2.  Stages and individuals, situations and worlds 
2.1.  Carlson's treatment of perceptual reports 
Carlson 1977 proposes an ontology that is somewhat rieher than what is assumed in standard 
model theoretic semanties.  Like most semanticists, he  assurnes that there are  "ordinary" in-
dividuals that possibly change their properties but nevertheless keep their identity over time. 
These run-of-the-mill individuals are called "objects" by Carlson. Next to objects, he assurnes 
a domain of  "kinds" as independent entities. Objects and kinds jointly constitute the domain of 
"individuals". Finally, he considers a domain of "stages", i.e. temporally and locally restricted 
parts of  individuals.  For the purposes of our discussion, we can ignore kinds, so we may con-
sider stages to be time slices of  objects.  Stages and individuals belong to disjoint domains; the 
connection between them is established by some predefined relation R  that connects a stage to 
the individual it is a stage of.  So the formula "R(a, b)" is to be read as "stage a is a time slice 
of object b". 
The sortal structure of the domain of individuals is inherited by higher order domains.  In par-
ticular, Carlson distinguishes between properties of individuals and properties of stages.  This 
distinction is reflected by the type structure of natural languages.  Some predicates, so-called 
"Individual Level Predicates" (ILPs) denote properties ofindividuals, while "Stage Level Pred-
icates" (SLPs) refer to properties of stages.  Likewise, second order predicates may select ILPs 
or SLPs. 
In Carlson's system, both types of  predicates may occur in predicative constructions.  NPs are 
always classified as ILP, and some APs belong into that class as weIl.  Here are some examples 
of copular constructions with ILPs. 
(23)  a.  John is a hero 
b.  lohn is the referee 
c.  lohn is intelligent 
d.  lohn is five feet tall 
Adjectival SLPs are also admitted in copular constructions, as weil as stage level PPs. 
(24)  a.  lohn is drunk 
b.  lohn is naked 
c.  lohn is in South America 
The distinction between ILPs and SLPs is crucial for Carlson's analysis of perceptual reports. 
He treats perception as a relation between stages rather than between individuals.  So the sen-
tence 
(25)  Sally saw Harry 
expresses the fact that there are  stages s of the individual Sally and h of the individual Harry 
such that s is in the seeing-relation to h.  Since the names Sa/ly and Harry are individual denot-
ing terms though, the lexical entry for the verb see has to be adapted accordingly.  Somewhat 
simplified (because we ignore the Montagovian lifting of objects to quantifiers), it will come 
out as in (26), where superscripts on the variables indicate their sort. 
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(26)  AX·i Ay'. :lz':lw' (R(z', Xi)  /\ R(  w', yi) 1\ SEE(z', w')) 
Here see is a simple transitive verb. Infinitive embedding see is treated similar. A sentenee like 
(27)  Sally saw Harry walk 
will receive a similar analysis, with the single complication that the infinite VP is interpreted as 
a property of  the perceived entity. So its semantie representation is 
(28)  :lx':lY"(R(x', s)  1\ R(yS, H)  1\ sEE(:r" yS)  1\ WALK(y')) 
Accordingly, the lexical semantics of infinitive embedding see is 
(29)  AXi AP'  Ayi.:lz':lw'(R(z", Xi)  1\ R(w', yi)  1\ SEE(Zs,W") /\ P(z")) 
Note that the infinite VP is predicated over the perceived entity, i.e. astage. Thus only SLPs are 
lieit here.  Hence the complement of pereeptual reports is a key diagnostic to  distinguish SLPs 
from ILPs. 
As Carlson 1977  points out,  this diagnostic indicates that all eopular predicates are ILP,  no 
matter whether the predicative phrase is SLP or ILP (the examples are mine). 
(30)  a.  *Gulia saw Gulio be a hero 
b.  *Gulia saw Gulio be the referee 
c.  *Gulia saw Gulio be intelligent 
d.  *Gulia saw Gulio be five feet tall 
e.  *Gulia saw Gulio be drunk 
f.  *Gulia saw Gulio be naked 
g.  *Gulia saw Gulio be in South Ameriea 
The consequences of this observation for Carlson's system are these: 
•  There are two homonymous copulas,2 one embedding ILPs and the other one SLPs, but 
•  the result of  composing either copula with its complement is an ILP. 
The ILP embedding copula does not make any semantic contribution, so it can be eonsidered 
the identity fimction over individual level properties (even though Carlson treats it syneategore-
matically). It is given in (31a). The other eopula performs a sortal shift from an SLP to an ILP. 
Its semantics is given in (31b). 
(31)  a.  APi.pi 
b.  AP" AX' .:ly'(R(y", Xi)  1\  P" (y,)) 
If we aceept perceptual reports as  diagnostic, the preposition as is the exact converse of the 
second version of the copula.  Since it is subcategorized for type NP, its complement is always 
ILP. The resulting PP, however, is generally SLP. 
2In addition to "active be" and be in passive constructions, that will be ignored throughout this paper. 
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(32)  a.  Gulia saw Gulio as a hero 
b.  Gulia saw Gulio as the referee 
So within Carlson's overall framework, the obvious candidate for the lexical semantics of  as is 
Stump's (33): 
(33)  '\P''\;r'  .  .3yi(R(x
S
, yi) /\ Pi(yi)) 
Carlson's general approach has been criticized by several  authors,  mainly  for  certain short-
comings concerning its treatment of genl'ricity.  These issues are of minor importance here; 
the interested reader is  referred to  Krif{l!9 et al.  1995  for  a detailed discussion.  However,  the  (]) 
approach to the semantics of perceptual verbs is not completely satisfactory either.  The idea 
of treating the infinite VP in naked infinitive construction as a secondary predicate of  the per-
ceived object has been criticized by Barwise 1981 in general, and his arguments apply here too. 
This can be illustrated by a scenario that Davidson used in a different context (Davidson 1969). 
Imagine a metal sphere rotating and simultaneously heating.  Suppose you see this sphere and 
its movement, but the change in temperature has no visible effect. Then the following sentence 
would be true: 
(34)  You see the sphere rotate, but you don't see it heat 
However,  in the described scenario, every rotating stage of the sphere is also a heating stage. 
So Carlson's semantics would predict the sentence to be false. 
There  are  certain aspects in Carlson's approach though that are  intuitively enlightening and 
deserve to be maintained even though the theory as such needs to be revised. First of  all, it is a 
striking advantage of his theory that it gives a principled explanation of copula effects to start 
with. Competing theories ab out the SLP/ILP contrast like Diesing 1992 or Kratzer 1995 predict 
that the copula has no impact on the c1assification of a predicate as stage level or individual 
level. 1fthis were true, copula effects would be entirely mysterious. 
Our own proposal will preserve the following features of Carlson's theory: 
•  The unacceptability ofthe examples in (30) results from a semantic incompatibility rather 
than from syntactic constraint violations. 
•  Objects of  perception are partial objects. 
•  Copular constructions express properties oftotal objects, while as-PPs denote properties 
o  f partial 0 bj ects. 
•  Therefore as-phrases, but not be-phrases are acceptable in perceptual reports. 
These Carlsonian (and to  some degree Stumpian) ideas will be combined with a more recent 
approach to the semantics ofperceptual reports, where objects ofperception are assumed to be 
eventualities rather than individuals. 
2.2.  Worlds and sitnations 
Barwise 1981 and Higginbotham 1983 present thorough examinations ofthe syntax and seman-
lics of perceptual reports involving naked infinitives.  They both come to the conc1usion that a 
sentence like (35a) should be analyzed as a paraphrase of (35b). 
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(35)  a.  lohn saw Harry walk 
b.  There is an eventuality s such that Harry walked in sand lohn saw s 
The mentioned authors defend different views conceming the ontological nature ofthe abstract 
eventuality 5  that is the object of perception here.  While Barwise develops a completely new 
foundation of semanties, situation theory, Higginbotham identifies 5 as an event in the sense of 
Davidson 1967. His ontology is thus entirely classical and extensional. 
Both Barwise's situations and Davidson's events are,  in asense, small or partial objects, i.e. 
they are part of the world and can be localized both locally and temporally.  This makes them 
plausible eandidates for objeets ofpereeption. Also, they share these properties with Carlson's 
stages.  lf  we want to maintain Carlson's insight that the ungrammatieality of eopular eon-
struetions in the eomplement of verbs of  pereeption is due to a partiality/totality mismateh, we 
have to look for total counterparts of (partial) situations/events.  Possible worlds are obvious 
candidates.  However, neither Barwise's nor Davidson's ontology considers possible worlds as 
eventualities, total or not. Davidson's ontology is purely extensional, and Barwise assurnes that 
there is only one possible world-the real world-that is too large (in a set theoretie sense) to 
be a situation.  So to carry through our neo-Carlsonian program, we have to work in an onto-
logieal framework that maintains the basic ingredients of the Barwise/Higginbotham analysis 
while allowing eo-existenee ofworlds and situations.  Kratzer's 1989 version of situation the-
ory provides a good starting point.  Modifying her proposal slightly, our ontology contains the 
following basic ingredients (cf. Kratzer 1989, pp. 614): 
S  a set, the set of  possible situations 
Aaset,  the set of  possible individuals 
<  a partial ordering on S U A such that at least the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  For no ö  E S is there an a E A such that s :s;  a 
(ii)  For all sES  U A there is a unique s' E S such that s  :s;  5' and for all s" E S: 
if s'  ::;  s", then s" = s'. 
peS)  the power set of S, the set of  propositions 
W  a subset of  S, the set of  maximal elements with respect to :S;.  W  is the set of  possible 
worlds. 
A few words of comment are in order.  In comparison to  other situation theories, Kratzer's is 
conservative in sticking to abivalent logic. So a proposition is either true or false in a situation, 
tertium non datur. This makes Kratzerian situations similar to Davidsonian events; if  we chose 
a metalanguage that contains variables over situations, we may consider situations as additional 
arguments of predicates in an extensional type theory.  Individuals may be parts of situations, 
and individuals may be parts of other individuals, but a situation cannot be apart of an indi-
vidual.  Possible worlds are a special kind of situations.  They are maximal with respect to the 
part-of structure of the domain of situations, so they cannot be properly extended.  All  indi-
viduals and all situations belong to exactJy one possible world.  So modal statements involving 
individuals or situations require a theory of  counterparts. 
For the purposes of this paper, the role of possible individuals in the ontology, and all issues 
conceming cross-world identification of individuals and situations may savely be ignored as ir-
relevant. We do need the dichotomy ofworlds and situations, and the conception ofpropositions 
as sets of possible situations. 
8 Towards an explanation of copula effects 
Kratzer does not discuss the issue of localizability of situations in space  and time,  but these 
aspects can easily be accommodated. Staying close to a Davidsonian intuition, we may extend 
the ontology with 
T  a set,  the set of  time  intervals that is  partially ordered by  C;;T  (inclusion) and 50T 
(precedence  ). 
L  a subset of A, the set oflocations 
T  a partial function  from  S  to  T  (temporal  location) such that the domain of T  is 
disjoint from Wand T( s)  :lT T( 5') entails s i  s' 
a partial function from S to L (location in space) such that the domain of  1  is disjoint 
from W 
To say it in plain English, situation may, but need not be located in space and time.  For certain 
situations, like those that support the truth of  mathematical statements, such a location does not 
make intuitive sense.  Possible worlds are  generally considered to be  too large to  be  located 
either in space or in time. 
Temporallocation together with the partial order 50  on situations induce a derived partial order: 
s ~  S' iffT(S) =  T(S')  and s ::;  s' 
This ordering relates those situations that take place in the same world at the same time.  We 
postulate that for any s in the domain of  T, there is a unique s' such that s ~  s' and for all 51!, if 
S' ~  sI! then s' =  sI!. Thus we define the domain 
WT  the set of  warld-time slices, the set of  maximal elements with respect to  ~ 
WS  the set of world size situations, i.e. the set {wl:Jw'  E WT : w' 50  'w} 
Note that the world-time slices are big insofar as they contain everything that is the case in their 
world in a given interval of  time, but they are small insofar as they are in the domain of  T. Still, 
they are too big to be in the domain of I, and----central for our purposes-they are too big to be 
objects of perception. World size situations are at least as big as world time slices, so they are 
generally too big for perception too. 
With this ontological background, we are ready to formulate the neo-Carlsonian premises of 
our approach to the semantics of perception reports: 
•  Perception is a relation between an individual and a small situation, i.e. a situation that is 
in the domain of  both 1 and T 
•  Copular constructions express propositions that are  true  only  in big situations,  i.e.  in 
world size situations. 
•  The propositions expressed by small clauses headed by as may be true in small situations. 
lt is imperative to admit that (the propositions expressed by) copular constructions may be true 
in world-time slices and not just in worlds,  since copular constructions are compatible with 
frequency adverbials: 
(36)  a.  John was a referee several times 
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b.  Harry is the chairperson again 
On the  other hand,  Maienborn 1999b points out that copular constructions are incompatible 
with situation extemallocative modifiers. 
(37)  a.  *Mary was tired in the car last night 
b.  *Paul is hungry over there 
This observation is  accounted for  by  the  assumption that world-time slices are too big to be 
localized in space. 
As a first step towards a compositional development, the be-predicate be a soccer fan and the 
pp as a soccer fan should be interpreted roughly as folIows: 
(38)  a.  be a soccer fan ~  ~\XAW.W E WS 1\ x is a soccer fan in W 
b.  as a soccer fan ~  AXAS.X is a soccer fan in s 
Next it has to be decided which predicate is more basic.  In other words, the predicative NP a 
soccer fan certainly supplies an eventuality argument (that originates from the property soccer 
fan, which is a relation between individuals and eventualities, like every property). The question 
is whether or not the eventuality argument of  the NP ranges over elements of WS. In the first 
case, as would somehow neutralize this sortal information; otherwise be has to be assumed to 
supply it.  We opt for the second version, for two reasons.  First, meaning composition is most 
naturally viewed as  a monotonic process where information is  composed and not destroyed. 
Only the second variant follows  this strategy.  Second,  in the  situation semantic literature it 
is commonly assumed that every NP  comes with its own situation which might be  different 
both from the described situation and the utterance situation (cf. for instance the discussion in 
Gawron and Peters 1990 or, in a Kratzerian framework, von Fintel 1994). That this assumption 
is virtually conceptually necessary can be seen from examples with deictic NPs, as in 
(39)  This house is larger than this house 
For this sentence to make sense, the referential situations for the subject and the object must 
be  different.  They are part of the  same world though.  Granting every NP its  own situation 
argument is thus independently motivated. 
Given this, the semantic contribution of as is twofold.  First it performs a type lowering from 
the generalized quantifier type of its NP argument to the type property of the entire PP. Second 
it makes the situation argument of the complement NP-which we assurne to be existentially 
bound by default-syntactically accessible. 
The lalter operation is  known as "existential disclosure" in the  literature (Dekker  1990).  lt 
is  only definab1e  in  a dynamic framework.  We  chose a compositional version of Discourse 
Representation Theory (Kamp 1981; Kamp and Reyle 1993), following suggestions developed 
in Asher 1993 and Zeevat 1989.3  There the NP a soccer fan will receive the translation
4 
3The recursivc model theoretie interpretation is given in the appendix. 
4We use a linear notation mainly for typographie reasons. The translation into to customary box notation should 
x,s' 
be obvious; thc following strueture would eome out as :\P:\s  SOCCERFAN(S',:V) 
P(8, x) 
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(40)  APAS.[:L', sIISOCCERFAN(S', x), pes, x)J 
So  the  lexical meaning of as comes out as  (41a),  which combines with a soccer fan  to  an 
expression that is equivalent to (41 b). 
(41)  a.  as =?  ATAyAS".T(s, AZASIII.[lZ = y, s" = Si]) 
b.  as a soccer fan =?  AXAS.[lSOCCERFAN(S, J;)J 
As for the copula, we follow Partee 1986 in the assumption that be always applies to a property. 
NP predicatives are lowered from generalized quantifier type to property type by means of a 
phonetically empty type shifting operator id.  The semantics of id is identical to the semantics 
of as given above.  The copula itself only performs a sortal shift ftom unrestricted situations to 
world size situations. So its lexical semantics is 
(42)  a.  be=?  APAXAW.[sIP(s,x),w E WS,s r;;;  wJ 
b.  beasoccerfan=?  AXAW.[slsoCCERFAN(S,X),w  E WS,S r;;;  wJ 
Note the similarity between this proposal for the semantics of the copula and Carlson's SLP 
embedding copula.  The main difference is  the  fact  that now the  eventuality argument rather 
than the subject argument is shifted from a partial to a total sort 
The final piece that is to be supplied is the semantics of  perceptual verbs like see. As mentioned 
above, objects of  perception are small situations, i.e. they must not be members of WS. So we 
arrive at the lexical entry 
(43)  see =?  APATAXAS.[SIIT(S', Pi, 5'  -t WS, SEE(s, x, S')J 
After aseries of A-conversions and simplifications, we arrive  at the  following DRSs for the 
minimal pair lohn saw Harry {as/be} a soccer fan; 
(44)  a.  lohn saw Harry as a soccer fan =? 
[x, y, s, s'IJOHN(X), HARRY(Y) , SOCCERFAN(S, V), s  -t WS, SEE(S', x, s)J 
b.  John saw Harry be a soccer fan =? 
[X,y, s,S',WIJOHN(x),HARRY(Y), SOCCERFAN(s,y),w  -t  WS,W  E WS,S  c::  W, 
SEE(S', X, w)J 
Obviously a copular predicate in a perceptual report results in a contradiction since the perceived 
situation is required to be big and small simultaneously. This results in unacceptability5 
Let us summarize the explanation ofthe copula effects in perceptual reports that was developed 
in this section. The key assumptions are the following: 
•  We adopt a slightly modified Kratzer style situation theory  . 
•  We distinguish between big (i.e. world size) and small (i.e. localizable) situations.  Only 
small situations can be perceived. 
5 Later we will incorporate presuppositions and treat these contradictory requirements as conflicting presuppo-
sitions. This will result in outright uninterpretability. 
11 Gerhard Jäger 
•  Following Barwise and Higginbotham,  we analyse pereeptual reports  as  expressing a 
relation between the perceiver and a pereeived situation that is in turn deseribed by the 
eomplement ofthe verb. 
•  NP predicatives supply a situation argument ofunspecified size. 
•  The preposition as leaves the size of the situation argument unspecified, so the result is 
consistent with the requirement ofthe matrix verb that the perceived situation be smal!. 
•  The copula be absorbs the situation argument from the predicative and instead returns a 
world size eventuality argument. This results in a conflict with the requirements imposed 
by the matrix verb. 
3.  Guises vs. presuppositions 
3.1.  Landman 1989 
The best known approach to the semantics of as-headed adjuncts is  given in Landman 1989. 
There only adnominal as-PP  are considered.  According to  our (and Fox's  1993) intuitions, 
adnominal as-adjuncts modifying the subjeet are synonymous to the  corresponding adverbial 
construetions. In other words, we eonsider the following two sentences synonymous. 
(45)  a.  lohn as a judge is corrupt 
b.  As a judge, lohn is eorrupt 
We thus restrict our attention to the adverbial use of as-PPs. 
Landman gives eight axioms that a eorreet analysis of  as has to validate. 
1.  lohn as a judge is still lohn 
2.  lohn as a judge is a judge 
3.  lohn as lohn is lohn 
4.  If lohn as  a judge is corrupt and lohn as  a judge is  well paid then John as  a judge is 
corrupt and well paid. 
5.  If John as  a judge takes bribes and taking bribes implies being corrupt, then lohn as  a 
judge is corrupt 
6.  It is not the ease that John as ajudge both is and is not corrupt 
7.  John as a judge either takes or doesn't take bribes 
8.  If lohn as a judge is corrupt, lohn is a judge 
These axioms sound innocuous, and as  they stand, they are eonsistent.  They are intended as 
axiom schemes,  however.  If you replace lohn by any  other name or being a judge,  bäng 
corrupt,  ta king bribes ete.  by  any  other predicate,  the results  should still be axioms.  Now 
consider axioms 1 and 8. Replacing being corrupt in 8 by being lohn, we arrive at 
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8a.  If lohn as a judge is lohn, lohn is a judge 
The left hand side ofthis conditional is identical with axiom I, so we may apply Modus Ponens 
and derive the conclusion 
8b.  lohn is a judge 
Ifwe replace the predicatejudge in 8a. by non-judge, we may employ the same line of  argument 
to infer that lohn is  a non-judge.  In other words, Landman's axiom schemes imply that lohn 
(and any other individual) has all properties; they are inconsistent6 
Still, these axioms sound plausible, so we should ask which minimal adjustments have to be 
made to render them consistent.  I think that the only problematic aspect is the status ofaxiom 
8.  Landman presents this inference as an ordinary implication. Instead, I follow Umbach 1996 
to interpret it as apresupposition. So axiom 8 should be strengthened to 
8'.  "lohn as a judge is corrupt" presupposes that lohn is a judge 
Given this, the axioms  I, 2,  and 4 - 7 have a tautological assertoric part, but according to the 
laws of presupposition projection, they all have a non-trivial presupposition, namely that lohn 
is a judge. So it is no surprise that we may infer from axiom I that lohn is a judge. To transform 
axioms I, 2, and 4 - 7 into ordinary tautologies, we have to prefix them each with "If  lohn is a 
judge ... ". 
It goes without saying that under this perspective, an adequate account of  the semantics of as-
headed adjuncts requires a theory of presuppositions.  We  will make use of van der Sandt's 
approach that will briefly be introduced in the next subsection. 
3.2. Presuppositions in DRT: van der Sandt 1992 
In his  seminal article van der  Sandt 1992,  Rob van der Sandt proposes a unification of the 
seemingly unrelated phenomena of anaphora and presupposition.  He uses Kamp 's Oiscourse 
Representation Theory as background theory.  The treatment of anaphora in this framework is 
well-understood.  Taking this as  a starting point, he extends ORT with presuppositions.  Pre-
suppositions are treated as a kind of  complex anaphors, and binding of  presuppositions is com-
pletely analogous to anaphora binding. However, presuppositions admit a last resort resolution 
strategy that is applicable ifbinding fails, namely accommodation. Van der Sandt demonstrates 
that presupposition accommodation can be incorporated into his ORT-framework in a natural 
way.  So perspectives might be switched; in this theory, anaphors are a special kind of presup-
position that are special only because they do not accommodate. 
Rather than going through the formal details of  van der Sandt's theory, we will illustrate how it 
works with a few key examples. Before we do that, some words about the meta-theoretical status 
of  presuppositions are in order though. Up to now, we have treated ORT as something analogous 
to Intensional Logic in Montague Grammar, i.e. a convenient level of representation that can 
in principle be dispensed with, thus being compatible with a strategy of direct compositional 
interpretation.  This is  at odds with van der Sandt's intentions, since there ORSs are a crucial 
syntactic level of  representation that is indispensable for the treatment of  presuppositions. Only 
complete ORSs without unresolved presuppositions can be interpreted. 
6This was first pointed out in Fox  1993. 
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Since the issue of compositionality is orthogonal to the problems discussed in this paper, we 
will not go any  further into this problem.  Disciples of orthodox DRT may view the use of 
A-conversion as  a cwnbersome DRS construction algorithm without semantic impact.  For ad-
herents of  direct interpretation it should be added as a reassurance that Zeevat 1992 gives a com-
positional reformulation ofvan der Sandt's theory. Combining this with A-abstraction would be 
a tedious but not overly difficult technical exercise. We leave this for another occasion. 
Having said this, we can start with practical work. While in standard DRT a DRS consists oftwo 
components-the discourse markers and the DRS conditions-in van der Sandt's extension they 
have a third component, their anaphoric part. Technically speaking this is a (possibly empty) set 
ofDRSs.  So the translation of(46a), a sentence without any presupposition triggers, is (46b). 
We adopt the convention of  separating the DRS conditions from the anaphoric part with a slash. 
Ifthe anaphoric part is empty, we will omit it, so the abbreviated representation of(a) is (c). 
(46)  a.  A man entered 
b.  [XIMAN(x), ENTER(X)/0] 
c.  [XIMAN(X), ENTER(X)] 
Next we consider a case of presupposition binding.  Let us assume that adefinite description 
induces an existence presupposition, but no uniqueness presupposition.  Then the discourse in 
(47a) will receive the initial representation (47b). 
(47)  a.  A man entered. The man whistled. 
b.  [XIMAN(X), ENTER(1;), WHJSTLE(Y) / {[yIMAN(y)]}] 
Binding apresupposition eonsists of three steps.  First you have to  find a mapping from the 
discourse referents in the universe of the presupposed DRS to  diseourse referents that are ac-
cessible from the position of  this presupposed DRS. Second you have to replace every discourse 
referent in the conditions ofthe presupposed DRS by its image under this mapping. Finally you 
have to check whether the resulting DRS-conditions are subsumed by the embedding DRS.
7 
In the example, mapping y to x would fulfill this requirement since the presupposed condition 
MAN(y)  is transformed to MAN(X)  under this mapping, and this condition is part of the em-
bedding context.  All occurrences of the presupposed dis course marker are replaced by their 
image under this mapping.  So presupposition binding is a transformation on DRSs that would 
transform (47b) to (48). 
(48)  [XIMAN(X), ENTER(X), WHISTLE(X)] 
Note that this operation (as weH  as  accommodation) is only defined if the anaphorie part of 
the presupposition is empty.  So if apresupposition embeds another presupposition, resolution 
has to work inside out, starting with the most deeply embedded presupposition. An example is 
(49a). lts initial representation is (49b), which is transformed first to (e) and finaHy to (d). 
(49)  a.  If a man is blond, Mary will realize that the man is blond. 
b.  [XIMARY(X), [yIMAN(y), BLOND(Y)]  => 
[[REALlZE(X, [[BLOND( z) / {[zIMAN( z)]}]) / {[IBLOND(W) / {[WIMAN(W)]}]}]] 
7The last condition is missing in van der Sandt's paper, but leaving it out leads to massively inadequate results. 
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c.  [:E]MARY(X),  [y]MAN(y), BLOND(Y)] '* 
[IREALlZE(X, [IBLOND(y)]) / {[]BLOND(y)]}  11 
d.  [X]MARY(X), [y]MAN(y), BLOND(y)] '* []REALlZE(x, [IBLOND(Y)])l1 
Pronominal anaphors are analyzed as degenerate presuppositions that consist only of  a discourse 
marker (plus,  possibly, some sortal information about number and gender).  So the c1assical 
(50a) will be represented as (50b), which, after binding, becomes (50c). 
(50)  a.  A man walks. He whistles 
b.  [X]MAN(X), WALK(x), WHISTLE(y)/{[y] n] 
c.  [X;]MAN(X), WALK(X), WHISTLE(X)] 
Van der Sandt assumes that there is a preference for "deep" binding, i.e. if there are several 
potential binders at different levels of embedding around for a presupposed discourse marker, 
binding on a deeper level of embedding will be preferred.  So in (51), the system (correctly) 
predicts that binding it to the second occurrence of a dog is the preferred reading. 
(51)  There is a dog, and ifFido sees a dog, he attacks it. 
In many cases, apresupposition does not find an appropriate binder.  Presupposition accom-
modation is arepair strategy that renders such a discourse interpretable. In the present system, 
the implementation of this idea is extremely simple: we simply add the presupposition to some 
DRS that is accessible from the original site of the presupposition. Adding a DRS K  to a DRS 
K' is defined component-wise:  Add the discourse referents of K  to  the universe of K' and 
the DRS conditions of K  to the conditions of K'.  The anaphoric part of K  must be empty 
for accommodation to be defined.  Since in the general case, there may be several potential 
accommodation sites accessible for apresupposition, this process is non-deterministic. To take 
a simple example, (52a) receives the initial representation (52b).  Since binding is impossible 
here, accommodation is called for.  Bach of  (52c,d,e) are candidates for the final representation. 
(52)  a.  IfMary becomes a club member, the president will resign 
b.  [J;]MARY(X), [IBECOME_MEMBER(J')] '* 
[IWILLRESIGN(y) / {[y]PRESIDENT(y)]}  11 
c.  [X]MARY(:E), []BECOME_MEMBER(X)] '* [Y]WILLRESIGN(y), PREsIDENT(Y)ll 
d.  [X]MARY(X), [y]PRESIDENT(y), BECOME_MEMBER(x;)] '* [IWILLRESIGN(y)ll 
e.  [x, y]PRESIDENT(y), MARY(X), [IBECOME_MEMBER(X)] '* [IWILLRESIGN(y)ll 
These three options are traditionally called local, intermediate, and global accommodation, re-
spectively. Van der Sandt assumes a preference for "high" accommodation. So in the example, 
(52d) is correctly predicted to represent the preferred interpretation. However, if a presupposi-
tion contains a discourse marker that is bound from outside, accommodation must not lead to 
unbinding of that discourse marker. The next example illustrates this. 
(53)  a.  IfMary becomes a member ofa club, its president will resign 
b.  [X]MARY(X), [Y]CLUB(Y), BECOME_MEMBER(X, y)] '* 
[]WILLRESIGN(Z)/{[Z]PRESIDENT(Z, w)/{[w] nnll 
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c.  [XIMARY(X), [yICLUB(y), BECOMLMEMBER(x, V)]  =} 
[ZIWILLRESIGN(Z), PRESIDENT(Z, y)]] 
d.  [XIMARY(X), [V, ZIPRESIDENT(Z, V), CLUB(V), BECOME_MEMBER(J:, V)]  => 
[IWILLRESIGN(Z)]] 
e.  [x, ZIPRESIDENT(Z, V), MARY(X), [VICLUB(y), BECOME_MEMBER(X, V)]  => 
[lWILLRESIGN(Z)]f 
In (53e), i.e.  under global accommodation, the underlined occurrence ofthe discourse marker 
"V"  is  not bound.  Thus this reading is excluded.  Only (c) and (d)  are  good candidates for 
accommodation. Since the accommodation site in (d) is higher than in (c), intermediate accom-
modation wins here. 
3.3.  As, be, and what they presuppose 
After having set the stage, we can start to look at the anaphoric aspects of the adjunct con-
structions we  are  interested in.  First a pragmatic stipulation:  we assume that our discourse 
representation at the beginning of a discourse is never completely empty. There will always be 
at least an evaluation index Wo which is known to be world sized. More formally, our initial DRS 
will be at least [wal'wo  E W 5]. Next, we assurne that the information w  E W 5 that occurs in 
the lexical entry of the copula in (42a) should be considered apresupposition. Furthermore we 
stipulate that the situation argument of a sentence is filled with an anaphoric situation anaphor 
after semantic composition is completed.  So the initial representation of (54a) is  (54b), which 
after merging with the default context leads to (54c) via presupposition resolution. 
(54)  a.  lohn is ajudge 
b.  [s,  xIJOHN(x), JUDGE(s, x), 8  r;;  W / {[lw E W 5], [wl ]}] 
c.  [wu,8,xlwo E W5, JOHN(X), JUDGE(8,X), S r;;  wo] 
Furthermore we assume that the adjuncts that are discussed in this paper are generally frame 
setting in the sense ofMaienbom 1999a,b.8  We adopt two crucial features ofMaienbom's anal-
ysis here.  First, Maienborn assumes that frame setting adjuncts are topical. While a discussion 
of topic/comment structure lies outside the scope of this paper, it is  certainly on a line with 
Maienborns approach to assurne that topical material is old material, i.e. presupposed. Second, 
Maienborn suggests that the eventuality argument of frame setting adjuncts is freely supplied 
by pragmatics. Translated into the current framework, this means that the situation argument of 
these adjuncts is filled by a sltuation anaphor.  Under these assumptions, (55a) is translated as 
(55b) and thus interpreted either as (55c) or (d).  (Since both are logically equivalent under the 
proviso that JUDGE and CORRUPT are persistent predicates, we do not have to choose between 
them). 
(55)  a.  lohn as a judge is corrupt 
b.  [5, xIJOHN(J:), CORRUPT(S, :c), sr;; w/{[lw E WS], [wl]' [lJUDGE(S', x), [8'1  ]}]] 
c.  [wo, s, xlwo E WS, JOHN(x), CORRUPT(S, J:), sr;; wo, JUDGE(W, x)] 
8This does not cxclude the possibility of non-frame setting adverbials hcaded by aso  The following examplc 
illustratcs that such constructions exist, evcn though we will ignore them throughout this paper. 
(i)  John died as a catholic 
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d.  [wo, 5, xlwo  E WS, JOHN(x), CORRUPT(s, x), 5 C;;  WO, JUDGE(S, J;)] 
With this background, we can have another look at Landman's axioms. The (a) versions give an 
English formulation of  the respective axiom under the modifications that have been motivated 
above. The (b) sentences give their underspecified representation, while (c) represents the final 
interpretation. 
(56)  a.  If lohn is ajudge, lohn as ajudge is lohn 
b.  [xIJOHN(X), [5IJUDGE(s,x),s  C;;  w/{[lw E WS], [wl  n] => 
[sIIJOHN(X),51  C;; w/ {[lw  E W 5], [wl  ], [lJUDGE(S2, x),  [521  nlll 
c.  [wo,xlwo  E WS, JOHN(X), [SIJUDGE(S,X),5  C;;  wo]  => 
[SIIJOHN(X),51  C;;  woll 
(57)  a.  If  lohn is ajudge, lohn as ajudge is ajudge 
b.  [XIJOHN(X), [5IJUDGE(s,X),5  C;;  w/{[lw E WS], [wl]}l  => 
[sIIJUDGE(SI, x), SI  C;;  w / {[lw E WS], [wi ], [lJUDGE( 52, x), [52I]} III 
c.  [wo, xlwo  E WS, JOHN(X), [SIJUDGE(5, x), 8  C;;  wo]  => 
[SdJUDGE(51, er), s\  C;;  woll 
(58)  a.  lohn as lohn is lohn 
b.  [s, xIJOHN(x), sC;; w/{[Iw E WS], [wl]' [lJOHN(er), [s'l nll 
c.  [wo,5,:rlwo  E WS, JOHN(X), s C;;  wo] 
(59)  a.  Iflohn is ajudge, then if lohn as a judge is corrupt and lohn as ajudge is weil paid, 
lohn as a judge is corrupt and weil paid 
b.  [xIJOHN(X), [SI, 82, s4IJUDGE(51, :r), 51  C;;  WI, CORRUPT(S2, er), S2  C;;  W2, 
WELLPAJD(S4,:r),S4  C;;  w3/{[lwI E WS], [wII]' [lW2  E WS], [w21]' 
[lJUDGE(S3' x)], [s31]'  [lW3  E WS], [wal], [lJUDGE(Ss, x), [s51  n] => 
[s6IcORRUPT(S6, x), WELLPAJD(S6,X),S6  C;;  W4/ 
{[lW4  E WS], [w41], [IJUDGE(S7,X), [571  nlll] 
c.  [wo,:rlwo  E WS, JOHN(X) 
[SI, 82, S4IJUDGE(SI, x), SI  C;;  Wo, CORRUPT(S2, er), 52  C;;  wo, WELLPAJD(S4, x), 
S4  C;;  VJo]  =>  [S6ICORRUPT(56, :r), WELLPAJD(S6, x), s6  C;;  woll 
(60)  a.  If lohn is a judge, lohn as judge takes bribes, and taking bribes implies being cor-
rupt, then lohn as a judge is corrupt. 
b.  [xIJOHN(X), [SI, S,IJUDGE(SI, x), TAKE_BRIBES(52, x), SI  C;;  WI, 82  C;;  W2 
h,  yITAKLBRIBES(53, y)]  =>  [lCORRUPT(53, y)]/ 
{[lWI  E WS], [WIIJ,  [lW2  E WS], [W21J, [lJUDGE(s"r)], [841]}]  => 
hlcORRUPT(Ss,C), S5  C;;  W3/{[W3 E WS], [w31]' [lJUDGE(S6, x)], [s61]}1l 
c.  [wo, xlwo  E WS, JOHN(X),  [SI, s2IJUDGE(SI, J;), TAKE_BRIBES(S2, x), SI  C;;  Wo, 
S2  C;;  wo, [53, yITAKE_BRIBES(S3, y)]  =>  [lCORRUPT(S3' y)]]  => 
[s5IcORRUPT(S5, x), 55  C;;  woll 
(61)  a.  Iflohn is a judge, then it is not the case that lohn as a judge both is and is not corrupt 
b.  [xIJOHN(X), [sIIJUDGE(51, x), SI  C;;  WJ/{[lWI  E WS], [wll]}1  => 
[I~[s3IcORRUPT(S3, x), 53  C;;  W2, ~[S4ICORRUPT(54, x), 54  C;;  W3/ 
{[lW3  E WS], [W.11  ]}I/{[lJUDGE(S2, x)], [S21]'  [lW2  E WS], [wzl  nlll 
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c.  [wo,xlwo  E WS,JOHN(X), [sIIJUDGE(Sl,X),SI r: wo]  ~ 
[HS3ICORRUPT(S3, x), S3 r: Wo,  ~[S4ICORRUPT(S4, x), 84  r: wo]lll 
(62)  a.  If lohn is a judge, lohn as a judge either takes or does not take bribes 
b.  [xIJOHN(X), [SIIJUDGE(SI,X),sl r: WJ/{[IWI  E WS], [wII]}] ~ 
[I [S3 ITAKE_BRIBES(S:J, x), 83 r: w2/{[lw2 E WS], [w,1 ]}]V 
[I~[s4ITAKE_BRIBES(54' x), 84 r: W3/ 
{[IW3  E WS], [w31  ]}]]/{[IJUDGE(x, 52)], [821 n]] 
c.  [Wo,xlwo  E WS, JOHN(x), [sIIJUDGE(SI,X), SI  r: wo]  ~ 
[I [s3ITAKE_BRIBES(S3, x), 83  r: wo]  V [1~[S4ITAKE_BRIBES(S4, x), 84  r: wo]]]] 
(63)  a.  If  lohn as a judge is corrupt, lohn is a judge 
b.  [XIJOHN(X), [sllcORRUPT(51, x), SI  r: wJ/ 
{[IWI  E WS], [wII]' [IJUDGE(52, x)], [52I]}]  ~ 
[53IJUDGE(S3' :r), 83  r: W2, / {[IW2  E W 5], [W21  ]}]] 
c.  [wo, xlwo  E WS, JOHN(X) , [SJ[CORRUPT(SI, x), SI  I;;;  wo, JUDGE(SI, x)]  ~ 
[s3IJUDGE(S3, x), 53  I;;;  wo,]] 
(Note that the last axiom is actually ambiguous, depending on whether S2 is bound to S, or wo. 
In the latter case, global accommodation of  JUDGE  is  licit and we derive an (existing) reading 
where lohn's being a judge is entailed.) 
It is easy to  see that all these axioms are truth conditionally equivalent to the DRS [wo, xlwo  E 
WS, JOHNCL")].  Ifone grants that this is valid in the model, the modified versions ofLandman's 
axioms are in fact validated by our semanties. 
3.4.  Consistency and underspecification 
The really interesting point about as-headed adjuncts is the fact that they render else inconsistent 
statements consistent. We repeat the exanlple Landman 1989 uses to illustrate this effect: 
(64)  lohn as a judge is corrupt, but lohn as a janitor is not corrupt 
According to the semantics of as developed so far,  this will still come out as  a contradiction. 
However, a closer examination ofthe example reveals that it does not invo1ve two contradictory 
properties in any way. As Bartsch 1987 points out, the as-PPs supply values for underspecified 
parameters ofthe main predicate. So (64) can be paraphrased as 
(65)  lohn is a corrupt judge, and he is a janitor, but he is not a corrupt janitor 
This sentence is perfectly consistent. If  Bartsch's suggestion points into the right direction, we 
expect that the consistency effect disappears ifthe main predicate is not underspecified in a way 
that could be resolved by the as-phrase. This is in fact borne out. 
(66)  lohn as a student was exactly 6 feet tall yesterday at noon, but as an athlete he was exactly 
5 feet tall at that time 
This sentence is in fact inconsistent. 
So the picture that arises is the following; Contrary to what Landman suggests, the interpretation 
of  the subject in a sentence like 
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(67)  lohn as ajudge is corrupt 
is  entirely standard and classical;  the  sentence is  a statement about the individual lohn, and 
this individual is absolutely consistent.  There is no need for an ontology of "individuals under 
guises".  Rather, as-phrases playa role in the process of the resolution of underspecification. 
The consistency effects are a pure side-effect of this.  What has to be clarified is how exact1y 
syntax, semantics and pragmatics interact to bring about this effect. 
Bartsch 1987 suggests to bake the underspecification resolving ftmction of as-phrases right into 
the syntax-semantics interface.  Such an approach strikes me unattractive for two reasons. First, 
as-phrases have other functions as well,  as  the discussion in section I of this article demon-
strates.  Ideally,  one approach should cover as  many usages as  possible.  Second,  the  effect 
under discussion is defeasible.  If the context supplies a better value for the underspecified pa-
rameter of the main predicate, the as-phrase may be tumed into an ordinary presupposition. 
This is illustrated in (68). 
(68)  lohn is a highly creative researcher. Even as dean he was creative. 
In the preferred reading, the  second sentence entails that lohn was a creative researcher, not 
that he was a creative dean. Since this kind of non-monotonicity is characteristic of  pragmatics 
rather than ofthe "hard-wired" syntax-semantic interface, a pragmatic approach has some initial 
plausibility. 
To  be somewhat more specific,  we  believe that the underspecification resolving effect of as-
adjuncts is just a side effect of their presuppositional nature.  In other words, in the examples 
in question two dimensions of  underspecification are involved: unresolved presuppositions and 
underspecified parameters originating from lexical semantics.  Along both dimensions, resolu-
tion candidates are ranked by certain pragmatic preference measures. Van der Sandt's principles 
"Binding is better than accornrnodation", "Bind as low as possible", "Accornrnodate as high as 
possible" are some, but not all aspects that playa role here. Crucially, we assurne that resolution 
candidates along both dimensions of  underspecification wind up being in the same reference set. 
In other wards, resolution candidates that differ only in the choice of a lexical parameter might 
be ranked differently because one requires presupposition accommodation while the other can 
do with presupposition binding. 
How is lexical underspecification to be handled in the van der Sandt style version of DRT? We 
suggest that the sentence (69a) is equivalent to (69b) at some level ofrepresentation, where "P" 
is an underspecified parameter. Forrnally, we treat parameters as constants, so resolution comes 
down to a choice between models that map parameters to different denotations. 
(69)  a.  lohn is corrupt 
b.  lohn is a corrupt P 
However, the choice of a value for P is not entirely free;  it has to be supplied by the contexl. 
This means that P is anaphoric in a sense. In van der Sandt's framework, this amounts to saying 
that lohn's being P is  presupposed.  So an adequate representation of (69a) would be (70),9 
where the third argument of  the predicate CORRUPT indicates the dimension of  corruption. 
(70)  [wo, x, slwo  E WS,JOHN(x),CORRUPT(S,X,P),s r;;;  wo/{[IP(s, x)])] 
9por better readability, we preprocess the presuppositions conceming the eventuality argument. 
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So we assume that the sentence presupposes John's being P, and furthermore we assume that 
John's being P and John's being corrupt as a P are inseparable, i.e. they are true in the very 
same situation s.  Without further contextual information, this presupposition is locally accom-
modated, so the final interpretation turns out to be (71), as far as sentence grammar is concerned. 
The value for P has to be supplied by extra-sentential information. 
(71)  [wo, x, slwo  E  WS, JOHN(x), CORRUPT(s, x, P), s  c;:  Wo, pes, 7:)J 
Now reconsider the critical (72a), which receives the initial representation (72b). 
(72)  a.  John as a judge is corrupt 
b.  [wo, x, ",lwo E WS, JOHN(X), CORRUPT(SI, x, P), SI  c;:  wo/ 
{[lP(SI, x)], [lJUDGE(S2, x)], [s21  ]}J 
There is  no choice but to bind the anaphor S2  to  SI  and to accommodate the presupposition 
[lJUDGE(S2, CL')J.  SO we arrive at the intermediate representation 
(73)  [wo,x,sllwo E  WS, JOHN(X), CORRUPT(SI, X,P)SI c;:  Wo,JUDGE(sl,x)/ 
{[lP(SI, x)]}J 
Now we have to consider two options. 
1.  P receives some contextual value different from JUDGE. Then the remaining presupposi-
tion does not find an antecedent and is thus accommodated, yielding the representation 
(74)  [wo, x, sllwo E WS, JOHN(x), CORRUPT(Sl, x, P), SI  c;:  'Wo,  JUDGE(SI, x), 
P(SI,7:)J 
2.  Pis instantiated as lUDGE. This resolution step gives us (75a). From there we can proceed 
to (75b) via presupposition binding rather than accommodation. 
(75)  a.  [wo,J:,sllwo E lVS, JOHN(X),CORRUPT(SI,:C,JUDGE),SI C;:wo, 
JUDGE( SI, x)/  {[lJUDGE(  81, x)]} J 
b.  [wo, x, sJ!wo E WS, JOHN(X), CORRUPT(SI, x, JUDGE), SI  c;:  'Wo, 
JUDGE(SI, x)J 
Crucially, the first option has to take resort to presupposition accommodation, while the second 
option can do  with presupposition binding.  Since binding is  ceteris paribus preferred over 
accommodation, instantiating P with JUDGE is preferred over any other instantiation. Generally, 
taking the value for a presupposed underspecified parameter from another presupposition saves 
one accommodation step and is thus preferred. Of course this preference ordering is defeasible; 
if another instantiation of P leads to a configuration where binding is also possible (as in (68)), 
such a reading would not be blocked. 
To sum up so far,  our explanation of  the consistency effects runs as folIows: 
•  In the critical examples, the main predicate (Iike corrupt) is underspecified; it contains an 
open parameter for a property. 
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•  It is presupposed that this unspecified property holds ofthe subject. 
•  As-adjuncts trigger apresupposition that their complement predicate holds of  the subject. 
•  Identifying the unspecified property parameter with the content of the as-phrase leads to 
a configuration where accommodation is required only once; otherwise accommodation 
is required twice. 
•  The derivation with the least number of  accommodation steps wins. 
3.5.  Copular adjuncts 
From what we said in the previous subsection, one would expect that frame setting be-headed 
adjuncts behave exactly the same way.  Since all frame setting adjuncts are assumed to be pre-
suppositional, an appropriate choice of  value for the lexical presupposition ofthe main predicate 
should he\p to avoid accommodation here as weil. This is blatantly false. 
(76)  Being a judge, lohn is corrupt 
Here the dimension of  corruption is entirely open; the adjunct provides a reason for lohn's being 
a corrupt P, but it does not supply a value for P. 
Let us see what the formal theory predicts.  Putting the pieces from this and the last section 
together, we arrive at the initial representation (77) for (76).  Note that now the situation argu-
ment ofjudge, 82  is existentially bound by the copula, and an additional world size argument is 
introduced. 
(77)  [WO,X,SI!WO  E WS,JOHN(X),CORRUPT(sl,:r,P),81  !;;;wol 
{lIP(51, x;)], h!JUDGE(52, x), 52!;;; WI, I{WI  E WS}], [WI!]}] 
The next three resolution steps are fully deterministic; first we bind WI  to Wo,  second we bind 
the sortal restriction lIwo  E  WS], and finally we accommodate the remaining presupposition 
that originates from the adjuncl. 
(78)  a.  [WO,X,SI!Wü  E WS,JOHN(X),CORRUPT(SI,X,P),81!;;; 'wol 
{[!P(81, x)], [82!JUDGE(S2, x), 52!;;; Wt, I  {WI  E WS}], [Wl!  ]}] 
b.  [Wo, x, 51!WO  E WS, JOHN(X), CORRUPT(SI, ":, P), SI  !;;; wol 
{[lP(SI' X)],  [52!JUDGE(S2, x), 52!;;; Wo,  I{wo  E WS}]}] 
c.  [WO,X,SI!WO  E WS,JOHN(X),CORRUPT(51,X,P),51!;;; wol 
{[lP(51, x)], [52!JUDGE(S2, x), 52!;;; Wo]}] 
d.  [Wo, x, 51, S2!WO  E WS, JOHN(X), CORRUPT(.SI, x, P), SI  !;;;  Wo, JUDGE(S2, x), 
S2  !;;;  wo/{[!P(sl,;r)]}] 
Note that now,  JUDGE and P have different situational arguments.  So the remaining presuppo-
sition has to be accommodated, no matter which value we choose for P. We always end up with 
the structure 
(79)  [wo, x, 5t, 52!WO  E WS, JOHN(X), CORRUPT(SI, 1:, P), SI  !;;;  wo, JUDGE(S2, x), 
52  !;;;  Wo, P(SI, x)] 
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So with copular free adjuncts, every value for P gives rise to the same number of accommoda-
tions, and thus sentence grammar gives no elue how this underspecification is to be resolved. 
It  should be  noted though that the  intuitive interpretation of (76)  is  somewhat stronger than 
what (79) expresses;  it can be paraphrased as Because lohn is  a judge,  he is  corrupt.  The 
missing piece of meaning is arguably not supplied by sentence grammar, however.  First note 
that minimal changes in the construction change the  choice of the relation holding between 
John's being a judge and his being corrupt: 
(80)  Despite being a judge, John is corrupt 
We believe that the interpretative mechanisms involved here are analogous to the discourse in-
terpretation principles at the discourse level that are investigated a.o. in Asher 1993. Since sen-
tence grammar supplies descriptions oftwo unrelated situations in (79), the discourse module 
supplies a rhetorical relation like "reason" that connects these situations, to make the discourse 
coherent. This issue deserves further investigation, but it is largely independent of  the problems 
discussed in this paper, therefore we do not discuss it any further here. 
To summarize the discussion in this section, free  adjuncts may supply a value for underspeci-
fied parameters of  the main predicate due to their presuppositional character.  Information flow 
between adjunct and main predicate is provided by the presupposition resolution module.  How-
ever, this infonnation flow is situated. Only information about the same situation may be shared 
between different presuppositions. Copular adjuncts come with their own situation; thus infor-
mation flow is blocked there. 
4.  Weak and strong adjuncts 
As mentioned in the introduction, Stump  1985 noted that some but not all free adjuncts may 
be interpreted as part of the restrictor of some superordinate functor.  One of Stump 's minimal 
pairs IS: 
(81)  a.  Being a sailor, John sometimes smokes a pipe 
b.  Lying on the beach, John sometimes smokes a pipe 
While (8Ib) may be interpreted as Sometimes when he is lying on  the beach. .. , no such inter-
pretation is possible in (8Ia).  Here the adjunct is interpreted factively and linked to the main 
predication via the  discourse relation "reason" as  in the examples discussed in the previous 
section.  (Though less preferred, an analogous reading is possible for (8Ib) too.  Crucially, (a) 
has only this reading.)  In Stump's terminology, a free adjunct is "strong" if and only if it only 
admits a factive  interpretation in such a construction.  Adjuncts that allow a restrictive inter-
pretation are called "weak".  It should be noted that the distinction between weak and strong 
adjuncts is  stable across all kinds of binary operators.  Adverbs of quantification, the implicit 
generic operator, modal operators etc. induce exactly the same categorization. 
This distinction is relevant for  our topic because as-adjuncts are  always weak while copular 
adjuncts are generally strong.  In the sequel it will be demonstrated that this contrast is in fact 
predicted under the assumptions made above without further stipulations. 
Consider the following example 
(82)  As a tourist, John always smokes 
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Following standard practice, Iassume that an adverb of quantification like always (a) creates a 
duplex condition where the rest of the clause ends up in the nuclear scope, and (b) it binds the 
situation argument of the modified sentence (rather than a temporal argument, cf. Lewis 1975). 
Formally, the lexical entry of always thus is 
(83)  .\P  .\W.[lALWAYS([sls ~  w], [lP(s)]) I  {[lw E W SJ}] 
So the initial representation of (82) comes out as 
(84)  [wo, xlwo  E WS, lOHN(X), ALWAYS([SJ ISJ  ~  wo], [\SMOKE(Sl' x)1 
{[lTOURIST(S2, ".)], [821  J}])] 
In the next resolution step, the situation anaphor S2 has to be bound. Binding takes place as low 
a possible, so s, in the restrictor is the preferred binder. So the intermediate representation is 
(85)  [wo, xlwo  E WS, lOHN(X), ALWAYS([s,ls,  ~  wo], [ISMOKE(S"  x)1 
{[ITOURIST(S"  x)]}])] 
There is  no antecedent for  the  remaining presupposition;  it has  to  be  accommodated.  The 
accommodation site should be as high as possible provided no bound discourse markers become 
unbound. Here the discourse marker 5, is bound in the restrictor, thus global accommodation is 
blocked. Intermediate accommodation is the preferred option, i.e. 
(86)  [wo, xlwo  E WS, lOHN(X), ALWAYS([s,lsJ  ~  wo, TOURIST(S"  J;)], [ISMOKE(s"  x)])] 
Note that there is also a less preferred option for global accommodation ifwe bind S2 to Wo. 
Now let us compare this with the strong construction 
(87)  Being a tourist, John always smokes 
The initial representation is  as  above,  apart from the fact that the  copula binds the  situation 
variable of tourist and replaces it by a world variable. 
(88)  [wo, xlwo  E WS, JOHN(X), ALWAYS([s,ls,  ~  wo], [lSMOKE(s"  x)1 
{[s2Is2  ~  W"  TOURIST(S2, xli  {w, E WS}], [w,1 ]]})] 
The world anaphor w, is preferably bound to the situation S1.  However,  this would enforce 
intermediate accommodation ofthe sortal information w, E WS. Binding Wj to wo, w, E WS 
need not be accommodated at all but can be bound at the global level.  We take it that the con-
straint "Avoid Accommodation!"  is stronger than the requirement "Bind as low as possible!", 
thus binding Of-Wl to  SI  is blockedlO  (ln analogy to pronominal anaphora one might further-
more assume that accommodation of  sortal information is impossible anyway, which would also 
block this binding.) So the only option for resolution of  Wj is high binding, which leads to 
(89)  [wo, xlwo  E WS, JOHN(X), ALWAYS([S1Is1  ~  wo], [ISMOKE("1, x)1 
{[B2Is2  ~  wo, TOURIST(S2, x)]}])] 
10 A formalization in the framework of Optimality Theory suggests itself;  see Blutner 1999 for a discussion of 
the optimality theoretic aspects ofpresupposition resolution. 
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Again the remaining presupposition must be accommodated, but this time nothing blocks global 
accommodation, so the final representation is the strong 
(90)  [wo, er,  S2\WO  E WS, 52  c::  wo, TOURIST(S2, er), JOHN(er), 
ALWAYS([51\SI  c::  wo],  lISMOKE(51,er)])] 
To  formulate the underlying idea on a somewhat coarser level, our explanation for the weakl 
strong contrast between as and be runs as folIows: 
•  Binary operators like adverbs of  quantification quantif'y over situations. 
•  As-adjuncts supply a situation argument that can either be bound by the operator or be 
identified with the evaluation index. 
•  Be-adjuncts supply a world argument that cannot be bound by the operator but has to be 
identified with the evaluation index. 
•  The presupposition of the nuc1ear scope is accommodated to  wherever its eventuality 
argument is bound.  This is either the restrictor of the operator or the matrix context for 
as-adjuncts, but always the matrix context for be-adjuncts. 
We conc1ude this section by pointing out two interesting consequences of  the theory sketched 
here. 
According to Stump, weak adjuncts are interpreted as part of the restrictor.  So (91 a) should be 
equivalent to (9Ib). 
(91)  a.  As a judge, John is always corrupt 
b.  When John is a judge, he is always corrupt 
Sharvit (p.c.) notes that this equivalence is not complete. A more adequate paraphrase of (9Ia) 
is (92). 
(92)  When John is a judge, he is always a corrupt judge 
So the as-adjunct in (91) serves two purposes: it restricts the adverbial operator, and it supplies 
a value for the underspecified dimension of  corruption. This is exactly what our theory predicts: 
(91a) receives the initial underspecified DRS (93a), which is transformed to (b) or (c), depend-
ing on whether P is or is not instantiated by JUDGE. Since the former admits binding while the 
latter requires accommodation, (b) represents the preferred reading, which is equivalent to (92). 
(93)  a.  '\wder\wI E  WS, JOHN(1:), ALWAYS([sl\sl c::  W2],  [\CORRUPT( 81, x, P)I 
{lIW2  E WS], [W2\],  lIP(51,X)], lIJUDGE(S2,er)], [S2\]}])] 
b.  [wo, :r\wo  E WS, JOHN(er), ALWAYS([sl\SI  c::  wo, JUDGE(SI, x)], 
lICORRUPT(SI, er, JUDGE)])] 
c.  [wo,er\wo  E  WS,JOHN(er),ALWAYS([SI\SI  c::  wo,P(SI,X),JUDGE(SI,er)], 
lICORRUPT(SI, x, pm] 
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Finally, the mechanisms involved in the interpretation of  as-adjuncts that are proposed here are 
in no way particular for this preposition. All observed effects are derived from general proper-
ties of presupposition resolution.  So we expect other presupposition triggers to lead to similar 
effects.  Arguably, appositives like the judge in the following example triggers the presupposi-
tion that John is ajudge (see for instance Lasersohn 1987; Umbach 1996 for proposals in this 
direction). 
(94)  John the judge entered 
So we expect the appositive NP to behave similarly to a weak free adjunct.  This is in fact what 
we observe. 
(95)  a.  John the judge always falls asleep 
b.  John the judge is corrupt 
Sentence (95a) can be paraphrased as Always when John is a judge, he falls asleep in one of  its 
readings, and (95b) can be interpreted as equivalent to John is a corrupt judge.  So neither the 
interaction with operators nor the interaction with underspecified predicates is an idiosyncrasy 
of as-adjuncts. Rather, both can be derived from their presuppositional nature. 
5.  Conclusion and further research 
Let us briefly summarize our findings.  We started the discussion with the fact noted by Stump 
that as-PPs are admitted in the complement of verbs of  perception while copular predicates are 
excluded there.  Stump analyzed this fact in a Carlsonian fashion by classifying as-PPs as SLPs 
and copular predicates as ILPs. 
We argued that the Carlsonian approach to the semantics of verbs of perception is insufficient 
for independent reasons. We proposed a modification that maintains some ofCarlson's intuitive 
approach.  We  agree with Carlson that perception involves partial objects, and thus predicates 
ranging over total objects are excluded in the complement of see.  However, we shift the par-
tial/total contrast from the domain of individuals to the domain of eventualities. To this end we 
employed a Kratzer style ontology where abstract objects may be  classified as possible situa-
tions or possible worlds. The contrasts between as and be was explained by the assumption that 
as-PPs denote properties that have a situation argument (inherited from the NP complement), 
while the copula induces a sorta! shift from situations in general to possible worlds. Therefore 
copular predicates are excluded in perception constructions. 
Next we turned attention to free adjuncts.  Following suggestions from Maienborn, we analyze 
free adjuncts as  frame setting,  i.e.  topical adverbials.  As such they are presuppositional.  We 
embedded this idea into the overall semantic/pragmatic framework by van der Sandl.  There 
presupposition resolution is considered a non-deterministic transformation over discourse rep-
resentations.  The possible outcomes are evaluated according to several criteria.  The principle 
"Presupposition binding is better than presupposition accommodation" turned out to be crucial 
for the analysis of  the phenomena under investigation. As-adjuncts may supply a value for un-
derspecified aspects of the meaning of the main predicate because this parameter setting saves 
one accommodation step.  This only works if the main predicate and the free adjunct share a 
situation argument. Therefore this effect is not observed with copular free adjuncts; the copula 
introduces its own situation argument, thus information flow between the predicates is blocked. 
Finally we  demonstrated that the weaklstrong contrast between as-adjuncts and  be-adjuncts 
falls out from these assumption without further ado.  The situation argument of an as-adjunct 
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may be bound by an adverb of quantification or a similar operator.  The world argument of a 
be-adjunct can only be identified with the index of  evaluation.  Since in van der Sand!'s model 
presuppositions are always accommodated as high as possible, as-adjuncts prefer intermediate 
accommodation, i.e.  a weak construal, while copular adjuncts must be interpreted strong, this 
means via global accommodation. 
Let us conc1ude with pointing out some possible continuations of  this line of  research. As I ar-
gued elsewhere (Jäger 1999), Carlson overgeneralizes in subsuming several contrasts under the 
heading "SLP/ILP" that are better kept apart. However, if  the basic idea laid down here is right, 
the contrasts observed in the complement of perceptual reports, Sturnp's weak/strong distinc-
tion, and Maienborn's distinction between stative and non-stative predicates should coincide. lt 
remains to be seen whether this is borne out. 
Stump points out that the main verb have behaves similar to be. In his terminology, VPs headed 
by have are always ILP. And like be, have has a SLP-creating counterpart, namely the preposi-
tion with. He gives the following minimal pair: 
(96)  a.  Having green eyes, Mary might look something like Jane 
b.  With green eyes, Mary might look something like Jane 
Only (96b) admits a weak construal, (a) is unequivocally strong. Ideally, this contrast should be 
explicable solely in terms ofworlds vs. situations, as in the case of as and be. 
We restricted attention to frame setting adverbials here. As-PPs occur in other syntactic config-
urations as weil, as the following examples may illustrate. 
(97)  a.  John works as a judge 
b.  John acted as a judge 
c.  J  ohn was disguised as a judge 
If  our situation based approach to the semantics of  as is correct, it should provide insights into 
the semantics of  these and re1ated constructions as weil. 
Last but not least, cross-linguistic investigations are called for.  Severallanguages (Celtic lan-
guages, Hebrew,  Spanish etc.)  have  more than one copula.  Do they behave uniformly with 
respect to the world/situation contrast? If  not, what consequences are predicted, and are these 
predictions eonfirmed?  As for as,  how do  its cross-linguistic counterparts behave?  Russian 
seems to  be a particularly interesting case here, sinee instrumental ease-whieh corresponds 
to  English as in many contexts-may oceur in eopular eonstructions (cf.  Geist 1998; Partee 
1998).  So here we can observe a direct interaetion between the two modes of predieation that 
were treated as complementary in this paper. 
26 Towards an explanation of copula effects 
References 
Asher, Nicholas (1993): Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse, Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
Bartseh, Renate (1987): Context-dependent Interpretations ofLexical Items, in:  Jeroen Groenendijk, Dick de Jang 
and Martin Stakhof (eds.), Foundations olPragmatics and Lexical Semantics, 1-25, Foris, Dordrecht. 
Barwise, Jon (1981):  Seenes and Other Situations, Journal ofPhi1osphy 78,369--397. 
Blutner, Reinhard (1999): Some Aspects of  OptimaJity in Natural Language Interpretation, ms., Berlin. 
Bowers, John (1993): The Syntax ofPredication, Linguistic Inquiry 24, 591--{j56. 
Carlson, Gregory N. (1977): Reference to Kinds in English, Ph.D. thesis, University ofMassachusetts, Amherst. 
Davidson, Donald (1967): The Logical Form of  Action Sentences, in: Nicolas Rescher (ed.), The Logic o/Decision 
and Action, 81-95, University ofPittsburgh Press. 
- (1969): Thc Individuation ofEvents) in:  Nicolas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor 01 earl G.  Hempel, 216-234, 
Reidel, Dordrecht. 
Dekker, Paul (1990): Existential Disclosure, Technical report, ILLC, University of  Amsterdam. 
Diesing, Molly (1992):  Indefinites, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.). 
Fernald, Theodore B. (2000): Predicates and Temporal Arguments, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Fox,  Chris  (1993):  Individuals and  Their Guises:  a Property-theoretic Analysis,  in:  Paul Dekker and Martin 
Stokhof (eds.), Proceedings ofthe Ninth Amsterdam Colloquium, volume 11,  301-312, University of Amster-
dam. 
Gawron, Jean Mark and Stanley Peters (1990):  Anaphora and Quantification in Situation Semantics, CSLI, Stan-
ford. 
Geist, Ljudmila (1998):  Kopulaverben und Prädikativkonstruktionen:  ein deutsch-russischer Vergleich, Master's 
thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
Higginbotham, Jamcs (1983):  The Logic ofPerceptual Reports:  An Extensional Alternative to Situation Seman-
ties, The Journal ofPhilosophy 80,100-127. 
Jäger, Gerhard (1999):  Stage levels, states, and the semantics ofthe copula, in:  Ewald Lang and Ljudmila Geist 
(eds.),  Kopula-Prädikativ-Konstruktionen als Syntax-Semantik-Schnittstelle,  ZAS Papers in Linguistics  14, 
65-94, ZAS, Berlin. 
Kamp, Hans (1981):  A Theory ofTruth and Semantic Representation, in:  Jeroen Groenendijk, Theo Janssen and 
Martin Stokhof (eds.), Formal Methods in the Study o(  Language, 277-322, Amsterdam. 
Kamp, Hans and Uwe Reyle (1993):  From Discourse to Logic. Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics ofNat-
ural Language, Fonnal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory, Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
Katz, Graham (1994): The interpretation of  as-headed Adjuncts, in: Erin Duncan, Donka Farkas and Philip Spaelti 
(eds.), Proceedings ofWCCFL 12,547-560, CSLI, Stanford. 
Kratzer, Angelika (1989):  An Investigation ofthe Lumps ofThought, Linguistics and Philosophy 12, 607--{j53. 
- (1995):  Stage-level and Individual-level Predicates, in:  Gregory N. Carlson and Francis J.  Pelletier (eds.), The 
Generic Book, 125-175, University of  Chicago Press. 
Krifka, Manfred, Francis 1.  Pelletier, Gregory N.  Carlson, Alice ter MeuIen,  Gennaro Chierchia and Godehard 
Link (1995): Genericity: An Introduction, in:  Gregory N.  Carlson and Francis J. Pelletier (eds.), The  Generic 
Book, 1-124, University ofChicago Press. 
Landman, Fred (1989): Groups 11, Linguistics and Philosophy 12, 723-744. 
Lasersohn, Peter (1987): The Semantics of  Appositive and Pseudo-Appositive NPs, in:  Fred Marshall, Ann Miller 
and Zheng-sheng Zhang (eds.), ESCOL 86: Proceedings 0/  the Third Eastern States Conference on Linguistics, 
311-322, Ohio State University. 
Lewis, David (1975): Adverbs ofQuantification, in:  Edward L. Keenan (ed.), Formal Semanties, 3-15, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Maienborn, Claudia (1999a): Kopula-Prädikativ-Konstruktionen, draft, Humboldt University Berlin. 
- (1999b):  Situationsbezug und die Stadien/Individuen-Distinktion bei Kopula-Prädikativ-Konstruktionen,  m: 
Ewald Lang and Ljudmila Geist (eds.),  Kopula-Prädikativkonstruktionen als Syntax-SemantIk-Schnittstelle, 
(= ZAS Papers in Linguistics 14),41-64, Zentrum für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft, Berlin. 
Partee, Barbara (1986):  Ambiguous Pseudoclefts with Unambiguous Be, in:  Steve Berman, 1.  Choe and 1.  Mc-
Donough (eds.), Proceedings ofNELS 16, 354--366, GLSA, Amherst. 
- (1998): Copula Inversion Puzzles in English and Russian, paper presented at FASL 7,  Seattle. 
Stump, Gregory T. (1985): The Semantic Variablity of  Absolute Constructions, Reidel, Dordrecht. 
27 Gerhard Jäger 
Lmbach, Carla (1996):  Termpräzisierung:  Kontextuelle Steuerung der Interpretation durch Apposition und Ty-
pisierung, Ph.D. thesis, Tcchnical University ofBerlin. 
van der Sandt, Rob (1992):  Presupposition projection as anaphora resolution, Journal of Semantics 9, 333-377. 
von  Fintel,  Kai (1994):  Restrietions on Quantifier Dornains, Ph.D. thesis,  University ofMassachusetts, Amherst 
(Mass.). 
Zeevat, Henk (1989): A Compositional Approach to Discourse Representation Theory, Linguistics and Philosophy 
12,95-131. 
- (1992):  Presupposition and Accommodation in Update Semantics, Journal of Semantics 9, 379-412. 
28 Towards an explanation of  copula effects 
Appendix: Compositional DRT 
Syntax  The language of compositional DRT used in this paper is basically an extension of 
standard DRT syntax with A-abstraction. Every well-formed expression has a type, where types 
are formed from the basic types t (update) and e (entity) by means offunction space formation 
in the standard Montagovian fashion.  There are infinitely many variables and constants of  each 
type. Furthermore there is a distinguished infinite set DM of constants oftype e, the discourse 
markers. We use boldface lowercase Latin letters as meta-variables for discourse markers. The 
syntax is defined by the following mIes: 
Definition 1 (Syntax of Compositional DRT) 
1.  All variables and constants are expressions of  their respective type. 
2.  If'P has type (A, B) and 'I/; has type A, then 'P(1jJ)  has type B. 
3.  Ifv is a variable oftype A and 'P has type B, then AV.'P has type (A, B). 
4.  If both 'P and 1jJ  have type A, then'P =  'I/J has type t. 
5.  IfxI'"  Xn are discourse markers and 'PI'"  'Pm have type t, then [XI'"  xnl'PI,"', 'Pm], 
''PI have type t. 
Semantics  A model M  =  (!C, E, F) consists of a Kratzer frame  !C  in the sense defined in 
the text (a set of individuals A,  a set of situations  S,  an ordering of situations etc.), astate 
space E, i.e.  a set of partial functions from DM into the universe (with the  empty function 
as  a distinguished member), and a function F that sends all non-Iogical constants except the 
discourse markers to adenotation of the appropriate type.  Denotation domains of  the types are 
defined recursively as folIows: 
Definition 2 (Domains) 
I.  D(e)=AUS 
2.  D(t) =  {(er, T)  E E  x  Eier  <;;  T} 
3.  D(  (A, B)) =  D(B)(D(A)") 
Furthermore interpretation depends on a set G of assignment function that maps variables to 
functions from states to denotations of  the appropriate type.  The recursive interpretation func-
tion is defined as  folIows,  where meaning assignment is  always  relative to  a model (that is 
suppressed in the notation), astate er  and an assignment function g.  We need a 2-place merge 
operation ®  on states as  auxiliary notion, where  (er  ® T)(X)  = er(x)  if defined, else T(X)  if 
defined, undefined else.  er  ~Xl"  '.Xl  T means that Domain( T)  \ Domain(er)  =  {XI,' .. ,Xi} and 
er  <;;  T. 
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Definition 3 (Interpretation) 
1.  lfv is a variable,  Ilvll~ =  g(v) (0-). 
2.  Ifx is a discourse marker,  Ilxll~ =  J(x). 
3.  If cis a constant,  licll~ =  F(e). 
4.  11'P(Ij;)II~ =  11'P11;(.\TIIIj;II;) 
5.  II'\VA'PII;  =  {(a, 11'P11;[v~"J)la E D(A)l:} 
6.  II'P = ,pli; = {(T, T)  E I; x  I;111'P11;0~ = 11,p11;0
u
} 
7.  IIIXj·· ·xnl'Pj·· ·'Pmlll; = 
{h,  T2)  E  I; x  I;13T3(Tj  C;:X,Xn  T3 /\ T311'P111; 0···0 II'Pmll;T2)} 
8.  II~'PII; =  {(T, T)I  jlT2  : TII'PII;T2} 
As the reader may convince herself, aßTI-equivalences are meaning preserving under the usual 
restrictions. Furthermore, in the text we sometimes make tacit use of the conversion from 
to 
This transformation is also meaning preserving provided the discourse markers X n+! ...  Xn+l 
do not occur in any 'Pi. 
A DRS 'P is true iffthere is astate J  such that for any assignment function 9 : 011'PII~J. 
A final remark on the intended interpretation of  the non-Iogical constants used in the text. While 
intuitively a predicate constant like WALK  of type (e, (e, t)) is supposed to denote the relation 
between individuals x and situations s that holds exactly iff x walks in s, its denotation in the 
formal system sketched above is a 3-place function from astate and two individual concepts (i.e. 
functions from states to individuals) to an update.  However, the relation between the intuitive 
and the formal denotation is  a simple implicit type lift;  for the  example WALK  this means: 
TllwALKII;(a)(b)T' iffT =  T'  and the individual arT ® J)  walks in the situation b(T ® J). The 
interpretation of the other predicate constants used in the text is derived from their intuitive 
extension in an analogous way. 
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